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In a small but intriguing group of cases, individuals get perilously close to 
committing crimes only to pull back at the last moment. A man bent on killing his 
hated rival has the rival in the sights of his rifle, but does not pull the trigger. A 
man determined to rob a bank reconnoiters the bank, packs his gun and mask, and 
drives to the bank parking lot, prepared to carry out the deed, yet turns his car 
around and drives away. A woman desperate to purchase illegal drugs to which 
she is addicted approaches someone whom she believes to be a dealer, hails him, 
but having gotten his attention, turns and walks away. These kinds of cases raise a 
number of difficult issues within criminal law, but the one on which I focus most 
of my attention concerns whether and why individuals charged with attempts 
should be permitted to avoid attempt liability by arguing that they renounced or 
abandoned them. 
In order to isolate and clarify the issues, it will be assumed that the agents in 
question have not been interrupted by the authorities or concerned citizens before 
they could fully initiate their attempts. Agents who have been interrupted will face 
formidable problems making renunciation defenses because it will appear that the 
only thing that stopped them from going forward were forces external to them. Of 
course, some of these agents might have pulled back from their attempts had they 
not been interrupted and for reasons that convince us that they should be exempt 
from attempt liability. Such agents will simply be unlucky—they are entitled to 
the defense but will not, in most cases, be able to demonstrate this to the 
satisfaction of the court. However, it is possible to imagine other agents who, 
unbeknownst to them, are observed (by the police, private citizens, or on 
videotape) on the verge of initiating their attempts before they turn away from 
them. Suppose that such agents are, sometime later, arrested. The first question 
we face is whether they should be charged with attempted crimes. 
The answer to this question depends on an account of the conduct requirement 
for criminal attempts. How far along in the completion of an attempt agents have 
to get before they are appropriately liable to the charge that they have attempted a 
crime? Criminal law and legal theorists offer a variety of answers to this question, 
ranging from an agent having taken a “substantial step” toward the completion of 
the crime to the agent having committed an act that, on its face, constitutes an 
attempt or is such that harmful consequences have been unleashed that the agent 
can no longer control.
1   
In the first section, my aim is limited to defending a view 
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of attempt liability that leaves room for individuals to renounce (or abandon) 
attempts and walk away from them. For renunciation to be possible, we must not 
have a conduct requirement that tells us to wait until agents have set harmful 
consequences in motion that they can no longer control, or believe they have done 
so, to charge them with attempts. There must be a “buffer zone” of sorts around 
criminal harms, such that if individuals get very close to attempting them, they can 
be called to account for making attempts.
2 
How close they must get is a question 
that I do not address in any detail. The success of my argument in the first section 
depends solely on explaining the desirability of pushing the point of attempt 
liability back far enough from actually harmful acts so that it will be possible for 
agents to claim that they have abandoned them and should not be punished. 
In the second section, I take up the renunciation defense and offer what I 
believe is a novel approach to it.  Having been charged with attempts, under what, 
if any, conditions should individuals be permitted to successfully assert that they 
should not be punished because they pulled back before completing their attempts? 
The courts and legal scholars have also given various answers to this question.
3 
To 
a considerable extent, these answers depend on competing views about which 
motives for renunciation, or the circumstances in which it occurs, should be 
deemed acceptable by the criminal law. There is widespread agreement that 
interruption of an attempt by the authorities, or abandonment of an attempt due to 
the fear of imminent arrest by the authorities, should not constitute valid cases of 
renunciation. There is also considerable agreement that agents who leave off their 
criminal attempts due to the realization that what they are about to do is wrong 
ought to be entitled to renunciation defenses. Yet there is a variety of cases in- 
between these two extremes that have not been adequately explored in the existing 
literature. Moreover, there are different accounts of why renunciation should be a 
defense and these competing accounts have varying implications for the range of 
cases in which agents abandon their efforts to complete their crimes. 
The account I develop situates the renunciation defense within a retributive 
approach to legal punishment. Successful assertion of the defense requires 
individuals charged with attempts to convince a court that they did not go forward 
with them due to relatively independent acts of reason and will, and so do not 
deserve to be punished.  It will not be easy to make this defense, but a few agents 
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will be eligible for it, including, on my account, agents whose acts of reason and 
will are not necessarily morally motivated. 
In the third section, I briefly address the question of whether renunciation 
ought to be treated as a full or partial defense. I defend the former view, though I 
concede that individuals who manage to ward off conviction for attempts might 
nevertheless be punished for creating unreasonable risks for having taken 
substantial steps towards completing their attempts.
4 
However, offenses of risk 
creation should generally be punished to a lesser degree than attempts. And in 
some cases, those who abandon their attempts might not have unreasonably raised 
risks of harm and so should not be punished at all. 
Importantly, in discussing the range of cases in which individuals leave off 
attempted crimes, we must distinguish the theoretical analysis of such cases from 
what state officials can plausibly establish about them or criminal defendants can 
hope to prove about their own motives or actions. For purposes of analysis, my 
discussion assumes an omniscient point of view, according to which we know 
things about agents who come close to attempts that it is unlikely can ever be 
established with certainty, or even high probability, about some of them. The 
criminal law cannot be made a sharp enough tool to distinguish among the variety 
of agents who abandon their attempts so as to treat each of them as they ought to 
be treated. 
 
I. LEAVING ROOM FOR RENUNCIATION 
 
In thinking about the conduct requirement for attempts, consider the following 
two cases: 
 
SNIPER: SNIPER hates his business rival whom he believes has behaved 
underhandedly in out-competing him, pushing SNIPER’S business to the 
verge of bankruptcy. Hence, SNIPER decides to kill his rival. He buys a 
rifle, learns how to use it, sneaks out of his house early one morning, 
drives over to the vicinity of his rival’s house, and lies in the weeds a 
short distance from his rival’s house, waiting for him to step onto the 
porch so that he can shoot him. But when his rival appears on the porch, 
SNIPER gathers up his rifle and walks away from the scene. 
 
BANK ROBBER: BANK ROBBER is determined to rob a local bank that 
he has been reconnoitering for the last two weeks. On the day that he 
has decided to rob the bank, BANK ROBBER drives to the bank and 
parks across the street from it.  In his car he has a gun, a mask, and a 
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bag for the money he hopes to steal. He gets out of his car, crosses the 
street, and starts up the steps toward the main entrance of the bank. 
However, BANK ROBBER suddenly turns on his heel, goes back to his 
car, and drives off. 
 
Again, suppose that neither SNIPER nor BANK ROBBER, while their 
actions are observed or caught on videotape, is interrupted prior to leaving the 
scene of what appeared to be their impending crimes. In spite of this, their actions 
are reported to the police who subsequently arrest them. Should they be charged 
with criminal attempts—homicide in SNIPER’s case, armed robbery in BANK 
ROBBER’s? 
According to the Model Penal Code [MPC], the answer in both cases is pretty 
clearly “yes.” Both individuals have taken what the Code terms a “substantial 
step” toward the completion of their criminal intentions.5 Indeed, SNIPER and 
BANK ROBBER have taken several such steps. Others argue that neither should 
be charged with, let alone convicted of, attempts. Specifically, Lawrence 
Alexander and Kimberly Ferzan have recently defended an account of the conduct 
requirement according to which neither SNIPER nor BANK ROBBER has yet 
unleashed what he believes to be an “uncontrollable” sequence of events 
productive of criminal harm.
6 
SNIPER has not squeezed the trigger firing off a 
round, and BANK ROBBER has not entered the bank and handed a teller a note 
demanding money, coupled with the threat of violence in the event of a failure to 
comply. 
Other accounts of the conduct requirement typically place it somewhere in- 
between the two poles represented by the Model Penal Code and the 
Alexander/Ferzan accounts.
7 
Importantly, several of these accounts establish a 
conceptual space in which agents might renounce their attempts before actually 
inflicting harms upon their fellow citizens. They leave this space because they 
justify charging individuals with attempts before they reach the last act that 
unleashes uncontrollable harmful consequences. Alexander and Ferzan’s version 
of the conduct requirement precludes renunciation. Once an uncontrollable 
sequence of events is set in motion, agents can, at best, feel remorse for what they 
have done and might be given some sentence mitigation for doing so. 
Why do Alexander and Ferzan insist that an attempt must be fully under way 
before individuals incur attempt liability?  Part of their answer is that people can 
 
 
 
5 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(1)(c) (1985). 
6 ALEXANDER ET AL., supra note 4, at 216.  For their more recent discussion of the issues 
raised by such cases, see also Larry Alexander & Kimberly K. Ferzan,  Danger: The Ethics of 
Preemptive Action, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 637 (2012). 
7 See DRESSLER, supra note 1, at 424–30.  For an illuminating account of how agents might 
move from initial thoughts or plans about crimes, to “first acts” toward implementing their intentions, 
to subsequent and ultimately “last acts,” see David O. Brink, First Acts, Last Acts, and Abandonment, 
19 LEGAL THEORY 114 (2013). 
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and do change their criminal intentions, even up to the last possible moment.
8 
Most intentions, including most criminal intentions, they argue, are conditional. 
Agents plan to do certain things if a host of conditions (some of which they might 
not even be conscious of) are satisfied.
9 
Few of our intentions involve resolving to 
do things tout court. Further, Alexander and Ferzan argue that the criminal law 
should punish people for what they have done, not for what it predicts that they 
will do.
10 
Until an agent relinquishes control over a chain of events, she is not 
culpable and should not be punished. Quoting Antony Duff, they suggest that if 
the state is to treat agents as responsible beings, and thus as capable of being 
guided by reasons, “it should be slow to coerce them on the ground that they are 
likely to commit a wrong if not thus coerced, since that is to treat them as if they 
will not be guided by the reasons that should dissuade them from such 
wrongdoing.”11 Importantly, in Duff’s view, this way of treating citizens is a 
“categorical requirement,” and thus, not one to be weighed against the interest in 
preventing other persons from harm.
12 
Moreover, Alexander and Ferzan concede 
that agents such as BANK ROBBER and SNIPER could be charged with 
something—offenses of risk creation—just not attempts.13 
Although there is much to admire in Alexander and Ferzan’s account,  I 
believe that, in the end, it is not plausible and that the arguments they give in 
support of it are unconvincing. It is implausible because, as the SNIPER and 
BANK ROBBER examples illustrate, the individuals in question seem to have 
done more than make some preparations for carrying out their criminal intentions, 
even substantial ones. Each was on the verge of carrying out his intentions and 
might be reasonably deemed to have initiated an attempt, though both pulled back 
from going further before committing the “last act.”14 Granted, they both might 
have changed their minds before unleashing causal chains that they could no 
longer control, but it does not follow that the government acts unfairly by arresting 
 
 
 
8 ALEXANDER ET AL., supra note 4, at 208. 
9 Id, at 203–06. See also ALEXANDER AND FERZAN, supra note 6, at 647–52. 
10     ALEXANDER ET AL, supra note 4, at 199. 
11     Id. at 209 n.11. 
12     DUFF, supra note 3, at 388. 
13 ALEXANDER ET AL., supra note 4. Alexander and Ferzan, have more recently argued that 
instead of punishing those who come close to the “last act” for attempts, we might impose 
“preventive restrictions of liberty” (or PRLs) upon them.  ALEXANDER AND FERZAN, supra note 6, at 
660–67. PRLs might consist of defensive actions by those citizens subject to imminent attack, 
preventive detention by the authorities of individuals deemed dangerous, or other, less-intrusive 
liberty-restricting measures. Yet it is not clear how PRLs can be made to satisfy proportionality 
constraints or distinguished from legal punishment. If individuals refuse to renounce their criminal 
intentions, would Alexander and Ferzan permit the authorities to detain them indefinitely? Also, the 
line between such detention and legal punishment seems awfully thin. Those preventively detained 
will be deprived of their liberty, like individuals imprisoned for their crimes, and likely will be 
stigmatized by it, unless preventive detention is made quite different from imprisonment. 
14     On the implausibility of the “last act” requirement, see DRESSLER, supra note 1, at 425, and 
DUFF, supra note 3, at 39–42. 
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them, charging them with attempts, and, in effect, requiring them to demonstrate 
that they have done so. Bringing in Duff’s point that the law should be “slow” to 
coerce does not rescue their account, though I think it is an important point. How 
slow to coerce should the criminal law be? Perhaps the Model Penal Code’s 
version of the conduct requirement is too “quick” to coerce, although showing this 
is not as obvious as some might believe it to be. After all, the MPC account does 
not make individuals liable for mere criminal intentions or even some preparations 
toward acting on those intentions. It requires a “substantial step,” whatever that 
means. Lots of individuals’ lives will be unaffected by such a conduct 
requirement—those who do not form criminal intentions or take substantial steps 
toward acting on them—and they will therefore enjoy considerable liberty to act as 
responsible agents. Even if more scope for responsible agency is better than less 
scope, other things being equal, why should an agent not be charged with attempt 
once the agent get as uncomfortably close to unjustifiably harming others as 
SNIPER and BANK ROBBER? Admittedly, in charging them with attempts, the 
state seeks to punish them for what it seemed they were about to do.  But this is not 
a prediction based on such dubious grounds as their criminal records or their 
psychological or sociological characteristics, or even the criminal intentions they 
have formed and fully plan (though without having taken any steps) to execute.
15 
Nor would it be punishing them for their “mere criminal intentions,” but for 
criminal intentions on which they had begun to act. 
A further crucial point is this: It is possible to move the conduct requirement 
back from the point at which agents unleash what they believe are harmful 
consequences that they can no longer control and still treat them as responsible 
agents if we grant them the opportunity to mount renunciation defenses. If we 
were to exempt individuals from attempt liability who, for instance, could 
convince us that, at or somewhat before the last moment, they realized that their 
intentions were horribly wrong and abandoned them, then we would effectively 
preserve most of the scope for responsible conduct that Alexander and Ferzan want 
us to preserve. Attempt law would thereby grant agents who have come perilously 
close to the “last act” a chance to act responsibly, and to convince us that they did 
so. Of course, some individuals who did or would have acted responsibly at the 
last moment will not be able to convince a court of this. There is a moral cost, in 
the form of punishment of the undeserving, to moving the conduct requirement for 
attempts back from the last act. But there seems nothing objectionable about 
having our legal practices communicate to individuals that if they come perilously 
close to acting on criminal intentions, even though they would have pulled back 
from them for the right kinds of reasons, they might not be able to avoid 
punishment.    “Do  not  come  so  close  to  harming  others  and  expect  to  avoid 
 
 
 
 
15     On the pitfalls of basing predictions of dangerousness based on actuarial characteristics, see 
R. A. Duff, Dangerousness and Citizenship, in FUNDAMENTALS OF SENTENCING THEORY: ESSAYS IN 
HONOUR OF ANDREW VON HIRSCH 141–63 (Andrew Ashworth et al. eds., 1998). 
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punishment,” would seem to be the takeaway message from such practices. Those 
unwilling to heed it cannot justifiably complain too much about what befalls them, 
especially if they have been given fair warning of such practices. 
Also, there is a moral cost to the kind of “last act” conduct requirement that 
Alexander and Ferzan support. All of the agents who pull back before the last act 
will avoid attempt liability, though they might be charged with and convicted of 
endangerment offenses. Yet some who pull back will do so because they 
encounter unforeseen obstacles or threats, whereas others will do so for different 
kinds of reasons, some of which might reflect better on them. Indeed, it is not 
clear that Alexander and Ferzan’s account could support attempt charges against 
agents whose actions were interrupted by the authorities, at least so long as the 
authorities got to them before the “last act.” This, in turn, means that none of the 
agents who leave off their attempts or have them interrupted before they get to the 
last act, no matter how close they get, will be required by the courts to explain their 
actions. That seems unfortunate. Some of them would have likely gone forward 
had they not “gotten lucky” and encountered threats or obstacles to their doing so. 
They therefore seem indistinguishable, at least when it comes to deserved 
punishment, from their counterparts who encountered no such obstacles and so did 
go forward. 
How far back from the “last act” we should move the conduct requirement for 
attempts is a vexed question that I will not attempt to answer. The position I 
defend is only that it seems reasonable to create a “buffer zone” around criminal 
harms, such that individuals reasonably can be charged with attempting such harms 
before they get to the “last act.” We might say that those who enter the buffer zone 
are prima facie deserving of punishment for attempts. But they should be given 
the opportunity to persuade us that they should not be punished, all things 
considered, because they renounced their crimes. Under what conditions 
individuals should be taken to have successfully asserted a renunciation defense 
will be explored in the next section.
16
 
II. COMPLEXITIES SURROUNDING THE RENUNCIATION DEFENSE 
Assuming that it makes sense to favor a conduct requirement for attempts that 
permits state authorities to arrest and charge individuals with attempts even if they 
have not committed the “last act” that sets an uncontrollable chain of harm- 
producing events in motion, under what conditions should individuals so charged 
be able to successfully assert renunciation defenses? In this section, I treat 
renunciation as a full defense. In the next section, I discuss the arguments of those 
who maintain that renunciation should be, at most, a partial defense. 
 
 
 
16 The buffer zone might be expanded or contracted, depending on the seriousness of the harm 
that would eventuate if individuals went through with their criminal intentions. Criminal attempts 
obviously vary in their seriousness, mostly as a function of the nature and extent of the unjustified 
harms, if any, they risk.  On this, see DRESSLER, supra note 1, at 424. 
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Return to the SNIPER and BANK ROBBER cases described at the outset of 
the previous section. Again, suppose that there are undetected observers of 
SNIPER or BANK ROBBER who, after watching them leave off their attempts, 
report their actions to the authorities. Having received those reports, the 
authorities proceed to arrest and charge SNIPER and BANK ROBBER with 
attempted homicide and bank robbery, respectively. What we think about the 
legitimacy of a renunciation defense for either agent will likely depend on the 
reasons for which they abandoned (or appear to have abandoned) their criminal 
projects. In laying out the different kinds of motivations that might move 
individuals to leave off their attempts, I will concentrate on SNIPER. With slight 
modifications, the following scenarios could be made to fit BANK ROBBER and 
other kinds of cases. 
 
Scenario A: SNIPER abandons his intention to kill his rival because 
SNIPER has a moral epiphany to the effect that what he is about to do is 
plainly wrong. SNIPER packs up and leaves, throws his rifle in a nearby 
river, and resolves to deal with his hatred of his rival through other 
methods, none of which involve illegality. [Moral Conversion] 
 
Scenario B: SNIPER abandons his intention to kill his rival because he 
thinks of his spouse and children and of the fact that, if he kills his rival 
and is caught, his arrest and conviction will not only destroy his family, 
but leave them bereft of his emotional and financial support. SNIPER 
packs up and leaves, throws his rifle in a nearby river, and resolves to 
deal with his hatred of his rival through other methods, none of which 
involve illegality. [Agent-Relative Reasons] 
 
Scenario C: SNIPER abandons his intention to kill his rival because he 
realizes that, if he is convicted of homicide, he will likely spend the rest 
of his life in some squalid prison fending off predation by his fellow 
inmates. SNIPER is prudent enough to not want to have to endure all of 
this misery so decides to deal with his rival through other legal and less 
risky means. [Prudence] 
 
Scenario D: SNIPER does not fully abandon his intention to kill his rival 
but, at the last moment, his moral qualms against doing so convince him 
to leave off doing so at this time. He picks up his rifle, drives off in his 
car, but does not throw the rifle in the river. [Moral Self-Control] 
 
Scenario E: SNIPER does not fully abandon his intention to kill his rival 
but, at the last moment, the thought of the ways in which his own family 
might suffer if he is convicted of homicide convinces him to leave off 
doing so at this time. As in the previous scenario, however, SNIPER 
does not get rid of the rifle. [Agent-Relative Self-Control] 
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Scenario F: SNIPER does not fully abandon his intention to kill his rival, 
but, at the last moment, the thought of the ways in which he would suffer 
if convicted of homicide convinces him to leave off doing so at this time. 
SNIPER keeps the rifle, however. [Prudential Self-Control] 
 
Scenario G: SNIPER is on the verge of pulling the trigger, but a sudden 
attack of cowardice or squeamishness prevents him from doing so. He 
leaves the scene mentally berating himself for his weakness and does not 
abandon his intention to kill his rival. [Internal Obstacle] 
 
Scenario H: SNIPER pulls the trigger but the rifle misfires. When he 
pulls it again, the rifle does not fire at all. Disgusted, SNIPER leaves the 
scene and drives off in his car, internally vowing to try again to kill his 
rival at some later juncture. [Disability] 
 
Scenario I: SNIPER is prepared to pull the trigger but just as he has his 
rival in his sights, rival’s neighbor comes out on his porch, or a police 
car goes past rival’s house, and SNIPER decides to postpone his attempt 
to kill his rival. [Postponement] 
 
Again, set to one side the epistemic difficulties in distinguishing among these 
scenarios in a court of law. The theoretically interesting questions concern which 
of the defendants should be eligible for the renunciation defense, assuming that 
any of them should be, and why they should or should not be eligible for it. 
Start with the strictures on the defense laid out by the Model Penal Code. 
According to the MPC, the defense is limited to defendants whose abandonment of 
their criminal intentions is “complete and voluntary.”17 In laying out the preceding 
scenarios, I have intentionally omitted agents whose attempts are interrupted by the 
authorities because I wanted to focus, instead, on scenarios in which agents appear 
to leave off their attempts all on their own. Nonetheless, such Interruption 
scenarios, as we might term them, are an important starting point for an analysis of 
the renunciation defense. The drafters of the MPC make clear that individuals who 
are interrupted by the authorities once they have taken a substantial step toward 
acting on their criminal intentions are not entitled to the defense. Their 
“abandonment” is not voluntary, the thought apparently being that, but for the 
force brought to bear by the authorities, the attempts would have gone forward. 
Abandonment is held to be little more voluntary when individuals leave off 
carrying through with their intentions because they see a police car in the 
immediate vicinity. Such imminently coercive incentives to desist are thought to 
undermine the voluntariness of abandonment, though it could be argued that the 
 
 
 
17     MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(4) (1985). 
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drafters of the MPC stretch the concept of non-voluntariness beyond its defensible 
boundaries. Normally, if I am speeding and I see a police car up ahead of me, 
whereupon I slow down, my response to the prospect of a ticket would not be 
accurately characterized as “non-voluntary.” One wonders if what the drafters had 
in mind here might be better captured by the notion that, in some cases, but for the 
somewhat fortuitous appearance of the police or other agents on the scene, those 
with criminal intentions would have gone through with them and so are deserving 
of punishment.  I develop this alternative account below. 
The preceding cases can be contrasted with ones in which individuals 
postpone acting on their criminal intentions—either to await better opportunities to 
execute them without the risk of detection and apprehension, or with a view to 
taking advantage of more lucrative or easier victims. Such agents are disqualified 
from the renunciation defense by the MPC’s insistence that the abandonment of 
criminal purposes must be “complete.” The same would presumably be true of 
individuals who failed to achieve their aims because they met unexpected 
difficulties (whether of an external or internal kind) in acting, but who do not 
renounce their aims, hoping to act on them at some later juncture. Hence, the MPC 
would also seem to rule out the defense for the scenarios I have termed 
Postponement, Disability, and Internal Obstacle. 
But what does the MPC imply about the scenarios in which SNIPER 
abandons his attempt through the exercise of some kind of self-control? It would 
seem that such abandonment is not “complete.” The Self-Controlled SNIPERs do 
not leave the scene vowing to kill their rivals, but they do not fully renounce their 
intentions to do so either. They have only (just) managed to keep themselves from 
acting on them. Nevertheless, they did stop themselves, rather than having to rely 
on others to do so. We might say that their criminal intentions are “suspended” or 
“inactive,” but the MPC seems to require more than this. Is it that such agents are 
still dangerous, and, as such, ought to be subject to attempt liability?
18 
Further, 
what does the MPC account imply about the SNIPER who pulls back due to 
Prudence or Agent-Relative reasons for action? Here, I think, the answers are 
quite unclear. Also, there is debate in the literature about whether the MPC 
requires something like what I have termed Moral Conversion for the renunciation 
defense to be successful.
19 
The courts have leaned toward requiring it.
20 
But is 
moral conversion necessary to the renunciation defense, and why might anyone 
think that it is? 
There appear to be two distinct arguments in support of requiring full moral 
conversion as a necessary condition of the renunciation defense. One says that full 
moral  renouncers  are  no  longer  dangerous;  the  other  says  that  they  are  less 
 
 
 
18 This is one justification cited by the Model Penal Code.  See Moriarity, supra note 3, at 20. 
As Moriarity notes, at 15, the Code’s drafters also believed that provision of the defense might induce 
individuals to desist from continuing with their attempts. 
19     See Moriarity, supra note 3, at 26–27; DUFF, supra note 3, at 395–97. 
20     DRESSLER, supra note 1, at 439–40. 
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dangerous than individuals who renounce for other kinds of reasons or from other 
kinds of motivations. Neither of these arguments is convincing. There is nothing 
about full moral conversion that guarantees its permanence. Criminal intentions 
that have been “completely” abandoned or repudiated, for the best kinds of 
reasons, can be rekindled at some later point. In fact, it is easy to imagine 
circumstances in which the SNIPER in the Moral Conversion scenario forgets or 
discounts his moral epiphany and his subsequent resolve to deal with his rival 
through legal means. Suppose that after a relatively peaceful period of co- 
existence, SNIPER’s rival again engages in underhanded business practices that 
drive SNIPER into bankruptcy. SNIPER’s rage at his rival returns, and  he 
resolves, this time, to carry through his intention to kill him. There seems nothing 
fantastic or even unusual about such a sequence of events. Yet this suggests that 
the MPC requirement of “completeness” is somewhat misguided. 
Further, it is doubtful whether full moral conversion better insulates 
individuals from rekindling their repudiated criminal intentions. Consider 
SNIPER scenarios B and C. In B, SNIPER abandons his plan to kill his rival 
because he realizes that he does not want to cause his family the ignominy and 
suffering that would attend his being apprehended and convicted of murder. Why 
would those agent-relative reasons (and hardly disrespectful ones) for conduct be 
less sustaining, over time than the fully moral ones that characterize SNIPER in 
scenario A? Even the more nakedly self-interested reasons of SNIPER in scenario 
C might be just as good at keeping SNIPER on the legal straight and narrow, over 
time, as more respectable moral reasons. Prudent SNIPER was not, after all, 
responding to the kinds of short-term, self-interested reasons to which SNIPER in 
scenario I was responding. No police car drove by, nor did SNIPER spot a 
neighbor who had inconveniently ventured outside his house and might serve as a 
witness to SNIPER’s activities. Instead, Prudent SNIPER realized the horrific 
risks to his own future welfare that he was taking and abandoned his attempt. It is 
not obvious that an appreciation of those risks cannot sustain SNIPER  from 
making future attempts on his rival’s life as effectively as full-fledged moral 
reasons will. 
In response, it might be argued that it is a mistake to view the criminal law as 
consisting solely of a set of prohibitions backed by prudential incentives in the 
form of threatened criminal sanctions for compliance failures. Numerous theorists 
argue that the criminal law, or at least substantial portions of it, consists of 
prohibitions backed by powerful moral reasons, and that one of the aims of legal 
punishment is to express authoritative public support for those powerful moral 
reasons by censuring criminal conduct.
21 
Viewed in this light, agents who undergo 
moral conversions and fully repudiate their criminal intentions exhibit a grasp of 
 
 
 
21 See A.P. SIMESTER & ANDREAS VON HIRSCH, CRIMES, HARMS, AND WRONGS; ON THE 
PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINALISATION 10–14 (2011); R.A. DUFF, PUNISHMENT, COMMUNICATION, AND 
COMMUNITY 80–81 (2001); ANDREW VON HIRSCH & ANDREW ASHWORTH, PROPORTIONATE 
SENTENCING: EXPLORING THE PRINCIPLES 17–21 (2005). 
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these powerful moral reasons in ways that agents who abandon attempts because 
they (only?) care deeply about their loved ones or themselves do not. Moral 
conversion, it might be claimed, resonates with the purposes of the criminal law in 
ways that love of family or self does not. 
There is no use denying that those who abandon their criminal intentions for 
moral reasons understand something more profound about the criminal law than 
those who abandon them for other reasons. The problem is that it seems 
inappropriate to require such understanding as a condition of avoiding attempt 
liability. We do not normally care whether people refrain from homicide, assault, 
or theft for moral reasons, or simply because they wish to avoid unpleasant 
encounters with the authorities.
22 
So why should we care whether they abandon 
attempts for such reasons so long as it is clear that they have abandoned them, 
unless, of course, we tacitly believe that other reasons are wholly or less reliable 
guarantors of future compliance with the law? 
To the preceding, it will be objected that if the motivation agents have for 
abandonment does not matter, then those who leave off attempts because the police 
arrive on the scene or because they encounter unforeseen obstacles, should also be 
entitled to renunciation defenses. In responding to this objection, we are brought 
back to the question of why renunciation ought to be a defense at all. It seems that 
there is a crucial difference between Prudent SNIPER, or the SNIPER whose love 
of his family leads him to desist, and the SNIPER who pulls back from his attempt 
because of his fear of imminent detection and arrest. But for the appearance of the 
neighbor on the porch or the police driving past, it seems reasonable to infer that 
Postponement SNIPER would have gone through with shooting at his rival and 
ought to be convicted of an attempt, just as the SNIPER who pulls the trigger and 
shoots deserves to be. The same is true for Disabled SNIPER, whose rifle jams, or 
Internal Obstacle SNIPER, whose squeamishness or cowardice blocks him from 
going forward. And it is obviously true for Interruption SNIPER, who is 
apprehended by the police before he can squeeze off a shot. Granted, Prudent 
SNIPER is to some extent prompted to pull off his attempt by the anticipated 
actions of state authorities, as is the SNIPER who pulls back for agent-relative 
reasons. But I would argue that what distinguishes the latter two cases from the 
former ones is that Prudent and Agent-Relative Reasons SNIPER call these 
unhappy future possibilities to mind all on their own and thus decide to abandon 
their attempts. Their pulling back from their attempts appears to be traceable to 
relatively independent exercises of reason and will on their part, things over which 
they have substantial control. They do not need the occurrence of proximate 
events over which they lack control—events that easily might not have occurred— 
to prevent or discourage them from going forward with their crimes.   In other 
 
 
 
22 Cf. DUFF, supra note 3, at 389. Retributivists typically insist that only beings responsive to 
moral considerations should be subject to legal punishment. Nonetheless, they do not hold that 
individuals who refrain from offending for purely self-interested reasons ought to be immune from 
punishment, at least so long as they are also responsive to moral considerations. 
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words, it is not “moral luck” that keeps the SNIPERs in the Moral Conversion, 
Agent-Relative Reasons, and Prudence scenarios from going forward, but rather it 
is actions over which they have control and thus are to their credit.
23
 
Still, we can imagine scenarios in which such agents likewise appear to be 
prompted to pull back from their attempts by fortuitous proximate events. Suppose 
that right before he leaves home to go shoot his rival, SNIPER’s spouse and 
children warmly embrace him, not knowing what he is about to do. Suppose also 
that it is the remembrance of that warm embrace that subsequently jars him into 
realizing everything that he is about to risk and thus to lower his rifle and walk 
away from the scene of his near-attempt. We might wonder why he should get 
credit for his renunciation any more than the SNIPER who acts in response to the 
sight of the police car. What if the embrace simply had not occurred? Or consider 
the Moral Conversion SNIPER whose moral epiphany occurs because, just as he is 
about to pull the trigger and shoot his rival, his rival’s spouse and children appear 
on the porch and the sight of them suddenly brings SNIPER to his senses. The 
appearance of the spouse and children also seems lucky and thus not to the credit 
of the SNIPER, even if his reaction to it is something over which he does have 
control. Why is it not reasonable to infer that, but for their appearance, SNIPER 
would have gone through with his crime and thus is not entitled to a renunciation 
defense? 
The preceding cases do, I admit, pose formidable problems for my account. I 
would not deny that there might be circumstances in which Moral Conversion and 
Agent-Relative Reasons SNPERS ought to be unable to convince a court that they 
abandoned their criminal intentions through relatively independent exercises of 
reason and will on their part. If the circumstances of their abandonments are as 
described in the previous paragraph, then they too were lucky and there seems little 
reason to conclude that they would not have gone through with their crimes in the 
absence of largely fortuitous events. In this respect, my account of the 
renunciation defense is more restrictive than versions that would grant it to all 
agents who undergo moral conversions, regardless of what precipitated them. 
Nonetheless, much depends on how near the prompting event is to SNIPER’s act 
of leaving off the attempt. I doubt that we would think it relevant if SNIPER’s 
family gave him a warm embrace a day earlier, or several days earlier. It would 
still be up to him, in such cases, to recall that event and permit it to enter into and 
play a significant role in his deliberations about whether to shoot at his rival. 
Similarly, if SNIPER had seen his rival with his family at some time in the past, 
that alone would not derail his plans unless he actively called it to mind and 
reflected on its moral significance. In cases such as these, SNIPER acts “relatively 
independently” of events over which he lacks control.  He does not just get lucky; 
 
 
 
 
23 For the classic discussions of moral luck, see B.A.O. Williams, Moral Luck, 50 PROC. OF 
THE ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 115 (1976); T. Nagel, Moral Luck, 50 PROC. OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 
137 (1976). 
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he independently employs his reason and will to make his actions conform to the 
criminal law.
24
 
As against my account of the renunciation defense, an alternative and 
intuitively plausible account says that the test of whether renunciation ought to 
exempt is whether agents are still dangerous or, perhaps better, persist in harboring 
their criminal intentions. On this alternative account, Moral Conversion, Agent- 
Centered Reasons, and Prudent SNIPERs are entitled to the renunciation defense 
because they have abandoned their criminal intentions and so can no longer be 
reasonably deemed dangerous. In this respect they are quite unlike the Interrupted, 
Disabled, Postponement, or Internal Obstacle SNIPERs, none of whom has 
abandoned his criminal intentions. Those whose criminal intentions persist and 
thus whose abandonment of them is not “complete,” are, it might be argued, 
appropriately liable to legal punishment once they have come perilously close to 
acting on them. 
The difference between this account of the renunciation defense and my own 
is clearly illustrated by considering the three Self-Control scenarios. In them, 
SNIPER does not fully renounce his intention to kill his rival, though he does stop 
himself from carrying out his attempt by a relatively independent act of reason and 
will. On my account of the renunciation defense, the SNIPER in each of these 
scenarios ought to succeed in asserting it, at least assuming that the relevant acts of 
self-control were not precipitated by fortuitous proximate events. Each of these 
SNIPERs shows himself capable of resisting his intention to kill his rival, though 
the intention to do so remains alive, at least in the sense of it’s not being fully or 
decisively repudiated. Each of them has wrestled internally with the reasons for 
and against shooting at rival and come down on the side of not continuing his 
efforts. Moreover, if each of them did it once, each of them can do it again and, 
we might say, should therefore be given the benefit of the doubt. Granted, such 
agents might bear watching or monitoring, if that is feasible. Yet conceding that is 
different than saying that they ought to be held criminally liable for attempted 
homicide. By contrast, on the account of the renunciation defense according to 
which it should be denied to those whose criminal intentions persist, none of the 
Self-Controlled SNIPERs should be able to ward off criminal liability. None of 
them has fully or decisively repudiated the intention to kill his rival. 
How should we decide between these competing accounts? Against the 
“persistent intentions” account, it might be argued that we do not generally think it 
 
 
 
24 A more radical objection would be that responsiveness to moral, agent-relative, or 
prudential reasons are equally contingent or fortuitous, and therefore as no more to an individual’s 
credit or under his control than the appearance of police on the scene, jammed rifles, or 
squeamishness. Yet it seems doubtful that the development or maintenance of moral, agent-relative, 
or prudential-reasons responsiveness is entirely beyond the control of individuals. Even if it is, it 
does not follow that their exercises of it, in specific choice situations, is likewise beyond their control. 
It is one thing to be endowed with capabilities of various kinds; it is another to utilize them on the 
appropriate occasions. 
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appropriate to punish individuals solely because they harbor criminal intentions.
25 
To do so would be to adopt a too-inclusive account of criminal liability. Also, we 
do not normally care if individuals struggle to control their criminal impulses; it is 
enough if they manage to do so. 
However, the persistent intentions account does not support punishing 
individuals solely for harboring criminal intentions. Instead, it says that once 
individuals have entered the buffer zone, they should have to convince us that they 
no longer harbor such intentions or else face punishment. Such individuals are 
unlike individuals who form criminal intentions, but whose self-control stops them 
before they go very far toward acting on them. By entering the buffer zone and not 
fully renouncing their criminal intentions, such individuals, it might be argued, 
show themselves deserving of punishment. 
Yet it is not clear why individuals who enter the buffer zone, but who pull 
back on their own, before harming anyone, deserve to be punished. They have 
done what we hope and want them to do, albeit they have done so too late to avoid 
arrest and charges. The alternative, and I believe a more plausible view, is that the 
individuals who deserve punishment for attempts are those who enter the buffer 
zone and would have gone forward except for the occurrence of fortuitous 
proximate events over which they had little control. Such individuals are a bit like 
ticking bombs. If they had found themselves in different circumstances, they 
would have “gone off.” Self-controlled SNIPERs are different—they have shown 
that they can defuse themselves, so to speak. 
Further, we should ask why the persistence of criminal intentions matters, 
even if agents have shown themselves capable of declining to act on them on one 
or more occasions. The most logical answer to this question would seem to be that 
agents whose criminal intentions persist are more dangerous than those whose do 
not. Yet if that is why a persistent criminal intent makes one eligible for attempt 
liability, then it is not clear why anyone who has ever adopted a criminal intention 
in the first place, especially one as odious as SNIPER’s, should be eligible for a 
renunciation defense. It is not exactly normal or admirable to intend to murder 
someone and to take steps in the direction of acting on that intention. Once one 
has done so, one would seem to bear watching for quite some time, even if one can 
show that one has undergone a genuine change of heart and fully abandoned one’s 
homicidal project. Moreover, as we have seen, fully abandoned intentions can be 
rekindled. Nothing about an intention’s repudiation guarantees the permanence of 
that repudiation. Unless having a persistent criminal intent can be severed from 
continued dangerousness, we might have to reject a renunciation defense for 
SNIPER regardless of his motivations for pulling back from his plan to kill his 
rival. 
 
 
 
 
25 But see DOUGLAS HUSAK, THE PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL LAW: SELECTED ESSAYS 47–52 
(2010) for where Husak explores the justifiability of punishing individuals for “thoughts” that take 
the form of “firm” criminal intentions. 
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Granted, it will be exceedingly difficult, in most cases, for individuals 
charged with attempts to convince a court that they would not have gone forward 
due to relatively independent acts of reason and will on their part. Prosecutors will 
argue that fortuitous external or internal events are what really led such individuals 
to desist; defendants will struggle to muster convincing evidence to the contrary. 
But a few defendants might be able to demonstrate that no police, or other agents, 
appeared on the scene to stop or discourage them from going forward. Such 
defendants might also be able to demonstrate that their subsequent actions confirm 
that they no longer harbor the criminal intentions in question, or at least that they 
are inactive in the sense that defendants are not looking for opportunities to act on 
them. The question we now face is whether once individuals have gotten so close 
to acting on their criminal intentions, they should be granted full or only partial 
exemptions from punishment for attempts. 
 
III. FULL DEFENSE OR MITIGATION? 
 
A further question to be addressed is whether renunciation should serve as a 
full defense or simply as a ground for the mitigation of punishment. Gideon Yaffe 
recently rejected the former view while endorsing the latter.
26 
His reasons for 
insisting that renunciation can serve only this more limited role are briefly 
elaborated. He claims that one who abandons an attempt “has committed a 
crime—the crime of attempt—and this fact is not erased by his abandonment, nor 
are most of the reasons for punishing attempts negated by it.”27 There appear to be 
two distinct arguments here. One says that abandonment does not erase or negate 
what the attempter has done so far. Perhaps the idea is this: Whatever an agent’s 
motivation, once she has satisfied the conduct requirement for attempt liability, her 
pulling back from acting on her intention does not cancel or annul her culpability.
28 
In a similar vein, Antony Duff recently argued that agents who come perilously 
close to acting on their criminal intentions, even if they pull back from doing so at 
the last moment, have “done wrong” and therefore deserve some punishment.29 
We might punish those who renounce less severely than we punish those who do 
not—much as we punish the remorseful less than the remorseless—but punish 
them we must. 
Yaffe’s other argument says that whatever our reasons for punishing those 
who attempt crimes, they hold for those who take steps toward attempting them, 
but back off before they actually harm anyone. Yet this argument—that our 
reasons for punishing attempts are equally reasons for punishing near-attempts—is 
 
 
 
26     YAFFE, supra note 3, at 291–92. 
27     Id. 
28     See Lee, supra note 3, at 141. 
29     ANTONY  DUFF, Risks, Culpability, and Criminal Liability, in SEEKING  SECURITY: PRE- 
EMPTING THE COMMISSION OF CRIMINAL HARMS 141 (G. R. Sullivan et al. eds., 2012).   Duff had 
earlier supported a full renunciation defense.  See DUFF, supra note 3, at 395–97. 
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convincing if we punish attempts simply in order to deter them. Perhaps we 
should punish individuals who come very close to harming others, even if they pull 
back at the last instance, in order to discourage all of them from starting down this 
path.
30 
However, if desert considerations play the primary role in a sentencing 
scheme, then it will be important to try and distinguish among those who abandon 
their attempts. Those who abandon due to relatively independent acts of reason 
and will do not, I have argued, deserve to be punished. They have not yet harmed 
anyone, though they came close to doing so. Those who abandon their criminal 
intentions because they feared imminent detection and arrest, were suddenly 
overcome by cowardice or squeamishness, found it more difficult than they 
expected to complete their crimes, or postponed their crimes because it suddenly 
seemed that there would be better opportunities to commit them later, are different. 
They deserve to be punished because they have crossed into the buffer zone and it 
is reasonable to conclude that but for the occurrence of proximate events beyond 
their control, they would have gone through with their attempts. 
This brings us back to the first argument. At first glance, it seems to conflate 
moral blameworthiness with liability to legal punishment. In arguing that we 
should not punish those individuals who abandon due to relatively independent 
acts of reason and will, I can concede that such agents have behaved in ways that 
are morally blameworthy. Nothing about their pulling back at the last moment 
changes that, though the fact that they do so on their own makes them undeserving 
of punishment. It does not follow that they ought to be immune from moral 
criticism, even condemnation. Furthermore, it is perfectly reasonable for the 
authorities, if they are subsequently made aware of how far  such  individuals 
appear to have gone toward making attempts, to arrest and charge them, and 
thereby call them to account for their actions. It will then fall to the individuals so 
charged to convince the court that, having gone as far as they did, they did not 
proceed with their attempts for the right kinds of reasons. It will not be easy for 
them to make this defense successfully, nor should it be. 
Furthermore, it might be appropriate for some of these agents to be charged 
with and convicted of crimes of reckless endangerment or other offenses of risk 
creation. Although some of the SNIPERs should not, on my account, be convicted 
of attempted homicide, all of them put someone at risk, especially by aiming a 
loaded rifle in the direction of their rivals, and so might be punished for having 
done so.  Similarly, those who light fuses on explosives, only to then change their 
 
 
 
30   YAFFE, supra note 3, at 296–302, argues that moral conversion removes a reason we have 
to punish those who move toward attempts but abandon them, namely, the need to maintain a 
sufficient deterrent to the completion of their attempts. Assuming that the typical punishment for 
attempts provides such a deterrent, moral converts do not need the prospect of it to induce them to 
desist from their attempts. But those whose abandonment is based on crass concerns about being 
punished might need the added incentives provided by the typical sanctions to induce them to desist. 
However, Yaffe’s argument puts greater reliance on the marginal deterrence capacities of longer 
sentences than seems warranted. 
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minds and extinguish them, or who poison food, only to abandon their attempts by 
disposing of the tainted food before it is consumed by the person they intended to 
kill, might be reasonably charged with and punished for creating unreasonable 
risks of harm, even if they can manage to convince a court that they renounced 
their attempts all on their own. Conceding this brings my position closer to that of 
Yaffe and Duff, without conceding that renunciation is grounds only for the 
mitigated punishment of attempts. 
Importantly, there might be cases of renunciation in which no punishment at 
all is in order, because the agents with nefarious purposes never put anyone in 
danger. Suppose, for instance, that instead of intending to shoot his rival, SNIPER 
intended to beat him to a pulp with his fists. To mark this change in modus 
operandi, let us rechristen him MAULER. Suppose MAULER drove to his rival’s 
house, waited in the bushes outside of it for his rival to appear, but when his rival 
stepped out onto his porch, MAULER renounced his intention and walked away 
without confronting his rival. It is not clear that MAULER can be plausibly 
claimed to have recklessly endangered his rival, just by “going armed” with his 
fists. And if he renounces his crime based on a relatively independent exercise of 
reason and will, then MAULER should not be convicted of attempted aggravated 
assault—even if his actions were somehow observed by others, reported to the 
authorities, and MAULER is (properly) arrested and charged and thus made to 
account for them. 
A final point: The claim that those who come close to initiating their attempts 
might be reasonably punished in some cases for offenses of risk creation, even if 
not for attempts, will be most persuasive if we set the conduct requirement for 
attempts fairly close to the last act.
31 
If we set it further back—say to the Model 
Penal Code’s requirement of a “substantial step”—then the risks created by 
attempters’ conduct might be insubstantial in many cases. After all, a single 
substantial step might not significantly raise the level of risk to others. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In a small group of cases, individuals will be observed initiating criminal 
attempts only to pull back from them before unleashing harmful consequences 
over which they lack control. Though they might be reasonably charged with 
attempts by the authorities, we can preserve opportunities for individuals to act 
responsibly by permitting them to argue that they pulled back because they 
renounced their crimes. I have urged an account of the renunciation defense 
according to which individuals should have to convince the court that they pulled 
back due to relatively independent exercises of reason and will on their part and so 
do not deserve to be punished.  However, renunciation does not have to be morally 
 
 
 
31     As Duff, at least, appears to do, though he rejects the “last act” approach of Alexander and 
Ferzan.  See DUFF, supra note 3, at 140. 
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predicated. It is enough if reflects the independent agency of individuals rather 
than the occurrence of proximate events over which they lack substantial control. 
Further, I have distinguished my account of the renunciation defense from one 
according to which the individuals who leave off their attempts must convince the 
court that they are no longer dangerous. Finally, I have argued that renunciation 
ought to be a full defense to attempt charges, though its success as such might not 
preclude individuals from being convicted on charges of having acted in ways that 
endangered others. 
